We propose a privacy-enhanced matrix factorization recommender that exploits the fact that users can often be grouped together by interest. This allows a form of "hiding in the crowd" privacy. We introduce a novel matrix factorization approach suited to making recommendations in a shared group (or "nym") setting and the BLC algorithm for carrying out this matrix factorization in a privacy-enhanced manner. We demonstrate that the increased privacy does not come at the cost of reduced recommendation accuracy.
INTRODUCTION
In a classical recommender system, a set of users rate a set of items, and these ratings are then used to predict user ratings for those items that they have not yet rated, see Figure 1 . The ratings supplied by each user are tagged with the user identity, for example, via a browser cookie, and so the ratings are individually identifiable. This raises obvious privacy concerns, whereby an attacker observing the item ratings submitted by each user may learn information that the user does not wish to disclose. Such an attacker might observe the rating by sniffing the network path between a user and the recommender system or, more likely, may be the recommender system itself so encryption of the network traffic does not constitute a defence.
It is well known that users can often be grouped together by, for example, interest in sport, type of movie, or choice of partner, and indeed this underpins most advertising campaigns. While such groupings are often carried out manually, there has also been interest in automated inference of abstract groups, and it is such unsupervised automated inference of abstract groups that we pursue in the present article. Namely, we start with the observation that the existence of abstract group structure raises the Authors' addresses: A. Checco, Information School, University of Sheffield, 211 Portobello, S1 4DP Sheffield UK; email: a.checco@sheffield.ac.uk; G. Bianchi, Dipartimento di Ingegneria Elettronica, Università degli Studi di Roma -Tor Vergata, Via del Politecnico, 1 00133 -Roma (Italia); email: giuseppe. bianchi@uniroma2.it; D. J. Leith, School of Computer Science and Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland; email: doug.leith@tcd.ie. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. c 2017 ACM 2471-2566/2017/05-ART4 $15.00 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3041760 4:2 A. Checco et al. Fig. 1 . Illustrating classical recommender system setup. Each user submits ratings for a set of items, where this set may differ for each user, the ratings being tagged with the user identity, see plot (a). The submitted (user,item rating) pairs can be gathered into a matrix R, see plot (b) , and the aim of the system is to predict the missing values, indicated by −. potential to use a group identity when submitting ratings to a recommender system instead of an individual user identity and in this way provide a form of "hiding in the crowd" privacy. One key challenge, which we fully resolve here, is to provide accurate recommendations to a user without requiring the user to disclose his or her personal ratings to the recommender system. This is essential to protect against the type of privacy disclosure attack considered here. Another challenge is the selection of appropriate abstract groups that yield good prediction accuracy while being shared by a sufficiently large number of users to provide a degree of privacy. In this article, we demonstrate that this is indeed possible for interesting, real datasets and, consequently, that the gain in privacy need not come at the cost of reduced recommender prediction accuracy.
In more detail, we introduce a set of artificial pseudo-identities, referred to as proxynyms (or, in short, nyms), with which users access the recommending service. These nyms differ from ordinary pseudonyms in that the same nym is shared by many users. From the point of view of the system, therefore, it receives a sequence of item ratings from each of p nyms rather than from n users. To make this setup work, two main tasks must be addressed: (i) each user must privately select an appropriate nym when submitting ratings and (ii) the received collection of nym-item ratings must be capable of being used to make accurate predictions of the user ratings. Observe that these two tasks are coupled and must be solved in a joint manner, that is, the set of users selecting a nym must share enough in common to permit accurate predictions to be made when only nym-item ratings are observed. Further, unlike in the classical setup, the same item may often be rated multiple times by a nym, since multiple users share the nym, and the nyms are not all equally "important" since one may be shared by many more users than another.
In order to make recommendations we build on existing matrix factorization approaches in which the matrix R of user-item ratings (see Figure 1 (b)) is decomposed as a product U T V , where the row dimension of matrix U and matrix V is much less than the numbers of users and items. The user-nym selection and nym-item matrix factorisation tasks can be viewed as decomposing the n × m user-item rating matrix R as P TŨ T V , where n × p matrix P T maps from users to nyms. The elements of P are {0, 1} valued and P is column stochastic (the columns sum to 1) so each user is a member of a single nym (extension to multiple nym membership is of course possible). One of our main contributions is the observation that, by use of the BLC algorithm, it is in fact possible to carry out this P,Ũ, V decomposition in a privacy-enhancing manner, without the need for sophisticated cryptographic methods.
At the cost of introducing a more complex factorisation task, we find that prediction performance competitive with the state of the art can be obtained using this approach, especially when the user rating matrix R is sparse (as it usually is). That is, the increased privacy does not come at the cost of reduced recommendation accuracy. Indeed, we show that it can yield improved accuracy over classical matrix factorisation. As already noted, this is perhaps unsurprising since, when nyms are chosen appropriately, users sharing a nym can usefully leverage their shared ratings/preferences in a more direct way than in classical collaborative filtering, where such leverage can become apparent only when the dimension of the latent space is very small. Further, we find that the projection P provides a useful form of regularisation that greatly reduces the sensitivity of performance to the choice of hyperparameters. While more computationally demanding that the standard matrix factorisation approach, BLC is still efficient and highly scalable.
In summary, the main contributions of the present article are as follows: (i) a novel matrix factorization approach suited to making recommendations in a shared nym setting, (ii) the BLC algorithm for carrying out this matrix factorization in a privacyenhanced manner, and (iii) its performance evaluation using a mix of both real and synthetic datasets. Although not the focus of the present article, we also note that a relevant feature of our approach is its potential for backward compatibility with many existing recommender systems and so its potential suitability for incremental roll-out.
RELATED WORK
The potential for privacy concerns in recommender systems is well known, for example, see Lam and Riedl [2004] , Calandrino et al. [2011] , Shyong et al. [2006] , Ding et al. [2010] , and Narayanan and Shmatikov [2006] and references therein.
Many existing approaches to making private recommendations are based on encryption and multi-party computation [Guha et al. 2011; Li et al. 2011; Aïmeur et al. 2008; Nikolaenko et al. 2013; Canny 2002] and are essentially clean-slate designs (not backward compatible with existing recommender systems). In Nikolaenko et al. [2013] , a trusted cryptographic service provider performs an encrypted version of the matrix factorization task used to calculate recommendations. In Aïmeur et al. [2008] , the user data are split between the merchant and a semi-trusted third party; if these two actors do not collude, the cryptographic system proposed allows user recommendations to be calculated without exposing private information. In Li et al. [2011] , content ratings and item similarity data are determined via distributed cryptographic multi-party computation, and recommendations are then generated based on interest groups and further personalised at each user's local machine. In the special case where the recommender system's task is to select which adverts to display, another approach [Guha et al. 2011] is for the web system to supply a large set of possible adverts to the user and for the user's browser to then privately make the recommendation decision as to which adverts are actually displayed. In Canny [2002] , a privacy-preserving scheme for a Singular Value Decomposition-(SVD) based CF algorithm is introduced.
Another strand of work on privacy-enhanced recommender systems improves privacy by perturbing ratings with noise. Initially proposed by Agrawal and Srikant [2000] , it is applied to collaborative filtering by, for example, Huang et al. [2005] , Kargupta et al. [2003] , and Polat and Du [2005] .
Perhaps the closest to the present work is that of Shokra et al. [2009] , who propose a peer-to-peer system for submitting aggregated ratings to a central recommender system. In Nandi et al. [2011] a middleware framework for supervised aggregation is discussed, but recommender performance is not considered. In Narayanan and Shmatikov [2006] , a technique where the distributed aggregation of online profiles is presented, but it requires a certain level of trust and coordination between users, and, being peerto-peer, privacy and recommendation quality strongly depend on the user connectivity.
Clustering of users in recommender systems in general is not new. In Ungar and Foster [1998] , Xue et al. [2005] , and Hofmann [2004] , a range of techniques (k-means and Gibbs sampling, a cluster-based smoothing system, and a cluster-based latent semantic model, respectively) are proposed that cluster users and items in an unsupervised manner. However, these are not suited to implementation in a distributed and private manner. Clustering with matrix factorization methods has received much less attention to date, with the notable exception of Ding et al. [2006] , and subsequent work building on this, in which an orthogonal non-negative matrix tri-factorization method is introduced. In Zhu et al. [2014] , it is observed that users with a few ratings can leverage the presence of users with many ratings to improve prediction accuracy, and Xin and Jaakkola [2014] considers a semi-private variant where private users can leverage the presence of public users with many ratings.
Finally, even if BLC deals with groups, it differs (in scope and technical construction) from traditional group recommender systems. Such systems were originally conceived [O'Connor et al. 2001] for social contexts in which people operate in groups (e.g., deciding which movie to see together or which restaurant to attend). Their goal is to provide suggestions suitable to all members of the group. As comprehensively surveyed in Boratto and Carta [2011] and Kompan and Bielikova [2013] , existing work differs in the use of user preferences and/or social information and in how such information is accounted when making recommendations for groups (or even settling disagreements between group members ). BLC is not a group recommender in the meaning above; it is an individual matrix factorization recommender that additionally clusters users into groups to improve the recommender's accuracy. In this sense, and putting aside our main privacy goal, BLC may be considered closer, in its scope, to content-boosted [Nguyen and Zhu 2013] or category/topic-based [Zhou et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2012] recommenders and, to a greater extent, closer to information matching approaches [Gorla et al. 2013] , which show that (probabilistic) matrix factorization approaches can be improved by adding information on content categories or user groups (which are built using user attributes or features). However, we stress that, unlike these works, we do not exploit any exogenous information such as user preferences of item categories, and we do not boost the recommender with an a priori computed group structure, but we try to learn groups through the own users' ratings, and we do this while performing the matrix factorization.
THREAT MODEL
The privacy disclosure scenario we consider arises naturally from attacks that have already occurred on production recommender systems [Narayanan and Shmatikov 2006] . Figure 2 illustrates the setup. A user sends encrypted ratings and receives recommendations through an authentication-based system. The user ratings are kept in the system storage, where more manipulation is needed to generate the recommendations. The recommender system can also decide to release an anonymised/aggregated version of the database. We imagine two main types of attack/threats 1 :
(1) The attacker has access to a leaked version of the user ratings database held by the recommender system. (2) The recommender system can decide to release an anonymised version of the user ratings database.
It is important to notice that the sensitive asset here is the stream of pairs of unique IDs and ratings. Knowledge of these potentially places two sorts of information at risk: (i) the mapping from ID to true user identity (which may be of interest in its own right) and (ii) the ratings submitted by the user being targeted for attack. When a single user is associated with each ID, then, since the rating profile associated with each ID is often unique, there is a risk that the association of a user with an ID may be inferred by de-anonymisation using external data [Datta et al. 2012; Aggarwal 2005] . In this case, both the mapping from ID to user identity and the ratings submitted by a user are then simultaneously compromised.
With this kind of attack in mind, our interest is instead in the situation where multiple users are associated with each ID. This changes matters significantly. First, consider an attack that aims to learn the mapping from ID to true user identity. When an ID is shared by k users, then the collection of (item, rating) pairs associated with that ID is now a mixture of ratings from the k different users. Provided the k users sharing an ID submit sufficiently different sets of (item, rating) pairs, then this attack can be expected to involve a harder inference task than when an ID is used by a single user. This is because the (item, rating) pairs submitted by the other users sharing the ID now act as "noise" that tends to mask the pattern of (item, rating) pairs submitted by the user being targeted. Of course, if the users sharing an ID submit sets of rating that are too similar to each other, then the protection against de-anonymisation provided by this direct mixing mechanism may be reduced, in which case additional measures can be envisioned, for example, inserting dummy ratings or other "noise" to increase diversity.
Second, when multiple users are associated with each ID, then linking a user to an ID no longer immediately reveals that user's ratings or even the more limited information consisting of the set of items rated by that user. 2 To see this, suppose for a particular item that only n of the k users sharing an ID have rated that item. Then an attacker does not learn whether the user of interest belongs to the set of n users who have rated that item or the set of k − n users who have not. It is only when all users sharing an ID rate a particular item, that is, n equals k for that item, that the attacker learns that the target user has rated that item. Even in that case the attacker does not learn the rating submitted by the user unless all users sharing the ID also rate the item identically. This direct "hiding in the crowd" mechanism might be further strengthened, if needed, by users additionally submitting a number of automated/dummy (item,rating) pairs 2 While an attacker might potentially also be interested in which items have not been rated by a user, in a recommender system the ratings by a user are usually extremely sparse, that is, the number of available items is much larger than the number of ratings submitted by any individual user. Absence of a rating is therefore typically much less informative than the presence of a rating. selected at random; then, even when an item rated by all users sharing an ID, any individual user has a degree of plausible deniability in that they can claim that their rating for that item was an automated/dummy one.
It can be seen that associating multiple users with each ID in a recommender system not only potentially makes the considered de-anonymisation attacks harder to carry out but also creates the foundation on which a number of still stronger mechanisms for enhancing privacy can be built. Supporting shared IDs, which we refer to as nyms, while still providing useful recommendations, is also the main technical challenge (inserting dummy ratings, etc., is relatively straightforward), and in the following sections we demonstrate that this can indeed be achieved.
Dishonest Users and Sybil Attacks
Attacks by dishonest users who submit false ratings in an attempt to manipulate the recommendations made by the system are outside the scope of the present article. Of course, this is an important challenge for all recommender systems, but it is not specific to the approach presented here. That said, the use of shared IDs/nyms does potentially facilitate Sybil attacks, and so we briefly describe one mechanism, based on the work of Chaum et al. [1990] , by which such attacks can be disrupted while making use of nyms. In summary, each user mints a number of session tokens (with associated serial number), blinds them with a secret blinding factor, and forwards them to the recommender system through a non-secure channel. The number of tokens available to a user is limited, for example, by requiring users to authenticate or make payment to the service in order to forward a token or perhaps by limiting the number of tokens allowed within a certain time window. Note that during this phase, the user might be identified to the system, for example, to make a payment. The system then signs the tokens with its private key without knowledge of the serial number associated with the tokens. On receiving the signed tokens back from the recommender system, the user can remove the blinding factor and use the tokens to submit ratings to the system anonymously. Double use of tokens is prevented by the system maintaining a database of the serial numbers of all tokens that have been issued.
MAPPING USERS TO NYMS
BLC decomposes the user-rating matrix R as P TŨ T V . The primary challenges are (i) finding an appropriate assignment of users to nyms, that is, the selection of matrix P, and (ii) the calculation of this assignment in privacy-enhanced manner.
Statistical Model
As in classic matrix factorization approaches, let vector U u ∈ R d associated with user u capture the users preferences in the latent feature space of dimension d, and gather these vectors together to form matrix U ∈ R d×n . Similarly, let vector V v ∈ R d associated with resource v capture its features in the latent space, and we gather these vectors together to form matrix V ∈ R d×m . The rating of item v by user u is a Gaussian random variable with mean U T u V v and the matrix of ratings of all items by all users is therefore a Gaussian random variable with mean U T V .
Let us now depart from the usual setup by further assuming that users belong to distinct groups.
ASSUMPTION 1 (NYM DECOMPOSITION). Matrix U can be decomposed as U =Ũ P, wherẽ U ∈ R d× p and P ∈ R p×n .
We can think of vectorŨ g ∈ R d , g = 1, . . . , p as the preference vector associated with a group of users. The preference vectors of the users belonging to that group can then be viewed as random variables with meanŨ g . We refer to each group g as a nym.
Matrix P then maps from nyms to users, with the uth column P u ∈ R p of P defining the mapping from the nyms to user u.
The rating supplied by user u for resource v is a Gaussian random variable
Gathering the user ratings into random matrix
. . , m} denote the set of user-resource rating pairs that are contributed by the users. Letting
The posterior distribution is
and so the log-posterior is
where C is a normalising constant and we have assumed Gaussian priors forŨ and V with zero mean and variance σ 2 U and σ 2 V , respectively.
Private Nym-Based Matrix Factorization
Use of nyms aside, the log-posterior expression (1) is of the standard form widely used in the matrix factorization recommender literature. To find the matricesŨ, V maximising log p(Ũ, V |R O ; P) requires knowledge of the rating R uv made by each user, and when this can be linked to the user identity, for example, via a cookie, then this is evidently non-private. However, when the user ratings possess a nym structure, we have the following key observation:
where
where (a) follows from the fact that R 2 uv does not depend onŨ or V . Hence, lettingR v := u∈U(v) R uv P u and using the fact that (v) is non-singular, we have that arg max
where (b) follows from the fact thatR
The condition that (v) is non-singular requires that the set of users rating item v is non-degenerate in the sense that every nym is used by at least one user (no zero rows in (v)) and the vectors of user assignments to each nym are linearly independent (the nyms are distinct).
By Lemma 4.1, matricesŨ, V maximising logp(Ũ, V |R O ; P) in Equation (3) also maximise the log-posterior (1). As we will discuss in more detail, the importance of Lemma 4.1 is that finding matricesŨ, V maximising Equation (3) only requires observations of nym ratingsR v and matrices (v), ∀ v. That is, ir does not require that individual user ratings are observed by the recommender system.
Of particular interest is the special case where users are each assigned to a single nym, and so the columns P u of matrix P have a single non-zero element (corresponding to the nym chosen) equal to 1. In this case, matrix (v) is a diagonal matrix with element (v) gg equal to the number of users who rate item v using nym g, and nym rating vector R v has element g equal to the average of the ratings for element v by users in nym g. Using Lemma 4.1, we then have the following.
ThenŨ, V is a stationary point of Equation ( 
Setting this equal to zero and rearranging yields Equation (9). Similarly, differentiating Equation (3) with respect toŨ g and setting equal to zero yields Equation (8).
It follows from Theorem 4.2 that to determine the matricesŨ, V maximising logp(Ũ, V |R O ; P), all that it is required for the recommender system to know is (i) the average ratings for each nym-item pair (namely, matrixR) and (ii) the number of users in each nym who rate item v (namely, (v)). There is no need for users to reveal their ratings in an individually identifiable way.
Regarding the nym to user mapping P, observe that the log-posterior is separable in the columns of P,
where U = {u : (u, v) ∈ O, v ∈ {1, . . . , m}} is the set of users providing ratings and V(u) = {v : (u, v) ∈ O} is the set of items rated by user u. Hence, we can find mapping P for each user u individually by solving min P u v∈V(u) (R uv − P T uŨ T V v ) 2 . Provided the nym-item factorization matricesŨ, V are made available to users by the recommender system, this optimisation can be carried out privately by each user on their own computer using their locally stored ratings R uv . There is no need to release the individual user ratings R uv to the recommender system or to other users.
BLC Algorithm
The foregoing observations suggest an iterative algorithm that seeks to maximise the log posterior (1) by alternating between the following two steps:
(1) Using the current estimates for the matrix of average nym-item ratingsR and the number (v) of users in each nym who rate item v, estimateŨ, V via Theorem 4.2.
(2) Given the current estimates forŨ, V each user u privately updates his or her column P u in P by solving min P u ∈I v∈V (u) 
p}, e i the vector for which element i equals 1, and all other elements equal 0. This optimisation can be trivially solved by simply calculating the objective for each element in (small) set I and selecting the lowest valued. The updatedR and (v) are then shared with the recommender system.
This two-stage process is given in more detail in Algorithm 1. At each iteration, each vectorŨ g of nyms g that are used by at least one user is updated using the current estimate of V . Then V is updated using the current value ofŨ. This is repeated until the improvement in the log-posterior falls below tolerance . The users then update their choice of nym privately in a distributed manner, andR, (v) are then updated accordingly.
Convergence
Since each update in Algorithm 1 is either a descent step or minimisation step, the algorithm is convergent, and, in particular, we have the following. PROOF. See the Appendix.
Discussion

Privacy-Preserving Calculation ofR, (v).
Once users have updated the columns of P, the updated values ofR, (v) need to be shared with the recommender system. This can be readily carried out in a privacy preserving manner and without the need for communication among the users.
To see this, consider first a simplified batch update where at each iteration users resubmit their ratings using their current choice of nym. Assuming users access the system via an appropriate anonymising connection, for example, via Tor [ Dingledine et al. 2004] , then this update need not reveal the user identities. Given these ratings, the matrixR of average item ratings by each nym can be immediately determined by the recommender system. The number of users sharing each nym can also be estimated, for example, by counting the number of ratings for each item (assuming that each user submits at most one rating for each item, and multiple ratings for an item provide an indication of the number of users sharing the nym). The extension of this to online submission of ratings is now straightforward. This setup is illustrated schematically in Figure 3 . 4.5.2. Scalability. The BLC algorithm has favourable characteristics from the point of view of scalability. First, the nym-item rating matrixR that needs to be factorized is of dimension p × m. In comparison, the user-item rating matrix R is of dimension n × m. Hence, the work scales with the number of nyms p rather than the number of users n, and we expect p n (as we show in Section 5, in real scenarios n > 70,000 and p < 200). Second, the nym-user mapping matrix P is of dimension p × n, but each column is updated by a separate user in a fully distributed manner, with no message passing or other co-ordination required between users. Hence, the update of P is of the "embarrassingly parallel" type [Srirama et al. 2012 ] and so highly scalable.
EXPERIMENTS USING SYNTHETIC DATA
We begin by using synthetic datasets where, by construction, we know ground truth regarding the number of nyms and so can evaluate the performance of the BLC algorithm against this. The setup considered in this section is intentionally tightly controlled so we can vary one aspect at a time and study its impact. The performance with real ratings data will be considered later. We compare BLC with the classic matrix factorization algorithm [Koren et al. 2009 ].
Synthetic Data
To generate a dataset with p user groups, we (i) select p points in the d-dimensional feature space as "group centres" and (ii) randomly draw n/ p simulated users for each group, with position drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean equal to the group position and variable standard deviation. For instance, with p = 5 and a standard deviation equal to 0.01, the users are tightly clustered around each of the group centres, as illustrated in Figure 4(a) . We generate item matrix V by drawing its elements from a Gaussian distribution and thus obtain the full user-item matrix R as U T V . We then remove entries uniformly at random from R to reach a desired degree of sparsity. Figure 4(b) shows the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of the predicted ratings obtained using the P,Ũ, V matrix factorization found by the BLC algorithm vs. the number of nyms. The data shown are the average over 50 datasets drawn randomly as described above, and error bars indicating one standard deviation are indicated. In this first example, there are m = 100 items; the latent feature space is of dimension d = 4; there are n = 10,000 users; p = 5 nyms; the users are clustered with standard deviation, 10 −4 , around the nym centres (i.e., tightly bunched); and 50% of the useritem ratings are missing values. It can be seen that as the number of nyms used by the BLC algorithm is increased, there is a sharp reduction in the RMSE once at least 5 nyms are used. Of course, this is not surprising but illustrates the ability of the BLC algorithm to correctly infer nym structure from the user-item rating data.
Performance vs. Number of Nyms
Also shown in Figure 4(b) is the RMSE of the predicted ratings when classic matrix factorization is used (where P is fixed to be the n × n identity matrix). It can be seen that once the number of nyms used is 5 or greater, the RMSE of the BLC approach is consistently lower than that of the classic matrix factorization approach. That is, by taking advantage of the nym structure within the user ratings, the BLC approach is able to make more accurate predictions since users sharing the same nym can leverage each others ratings. Figure 5 (a) plots the RMSE of the BLC predicted ratings vs. the sparsity of the observed ratings matrix and the number n of users. The data shown are the average over 100 randomly drawn datasets, and error bars are omitted because their size is negligible. It can be seen that as the number of users increases, the prediction accuracy improves when the rating matrix is sparse. For n = 1000 or more users, the prediction accuracy is insensitive to the fraction of missing values until this fraction exceeds 95%. The poorer performance with smaller numbers of users is due to the reduced statistical multiplexing: The probability that an item has no ratings by any member of a nym becomes significant for sparse matrices with only a small number of users. Conversely, when there are larger numbers of users, the nym structure allows users sharing a nym to leverage each other's ratings to improve prediction accuracy when the ratings data are sparse. 6 . RMSE of the predicted ratings vs. the standard deviation of users around the nym centres in the latent feature space, n = 10,000 users, p = 5, m = 100, d = 4, and the fraction of missing ratings is 5% and 90%. Figure 5 (b) plots the corresponding results when using the classic matrix factorization approach. It can be seen that, for all numbers of users, the prediction accuracy decreases as the observed ratings become more sparse. This approach cannot exploit the nym structure to improve predictions when the user data are sparse.
Challenging the Nym Assumption
In the previous section, the users were tightly bunched around the nym centres in the latent feature space. We now relax this and explore the impact of increasing the standard deviation and so the spread around the centres. Figure 6 shows the RMSE of the predicted ratings vs. the spread of the users around the nym centres. The inset plot in Figure 6 shows a two-dimensional projection of the positions in the latent space of the users (in blue) and nyms (in red) for a standard deviation of 10 about the nym centres. It can be seen that the prediction error with BLC increases roughly linearly with the standard deviation. The prediction accuracy is also largely insensitive to the sparsity of the ratings. For comparison, Figure 6 also shows the performance when the BLC algorithm is augmented using the extensions described in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. These extensions introduce adaptation of the number of nyms used, the number selected being shown in Figure 7 . Note that as the standard deviation around the centres in the latent space increases, we are degrading the original nym structure and so effectively increasing the number of groups, and this is reflected in Figure 7 . It can be seen that these extensions improve prediction performance but do not change the qualitative behaviour, namely that the prediction error increases roughly linearly with the standard deviation around the centres in the latent space.
Also shown in Figure 6 is the corresponding data for the classic matrix factorization approach. For smaller values of standard deviation, where the data have a strong nym structure, it can be seen that BLC outperforms the classic approach in terms of prediction accuracy. However, as the standard deviation becomes large, so the nym structure in the ratings is washed out, the prediction accuracy of the classic approach is better than that of the BLC approach unless the extensions in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 are used.
MEMORY AND TIME FOOTPRINT
To establish whether the proposed technique is practical and scalable, 100 random scenarios were generated for a variety of combinations of n, m values using five clusters with Gaussian noise as explained in Section 5. BLC algorithm performance is measured on a single core of an Intel Xeon Processor E3-1270 v3, 3.50GHz. The overhead necessary to employ the per-routine measuring of memory and time consumption is significant, affecting the measured values by up to one order of magnitude. Nevertheless, this instrumentation is important for understanding how memory and time consumption are affected by the different parameters of the algorithm.
In Figure 8 an analysis of the time and memory footprint vs. n and m is shown. The error bars are not shown when the standard deviation is negligible. While memory usage increases linearly with both number of users and items, the convergence time increases linearly only with the number items and remains roughly constant as the number of users is varied.
Importantly, we also analyse the scalability and performance when employing a warm start, that is, the re-convergence performance with new but similar data drawn from the same population after initial convergence. In Figure 9(a) , the convergence time to adjust to new data is analysed. The time to factorize a new group of users grows linearly with the number of users or items, but it is reasonably small (6s for 1,000 users and 500 items). Figure 9 (b) shows the median time to run a matrix factorisation when up to 1% of new users are added or when 1% of existing ones change their rating: At worst, the time to re-factorise is only around 60ms. Regarding scalability, from Figure 10 it is clear that parallelisation has the potential to bring substantial benefits, for example, if the factorization could be run in parallel to the client-side, since the convergence time per-user tends to a constant value.
EXTENSIONS TO BLC ALGORITHM
Selecting Number of Nyms
While BLC is designed to converge starting from any configuration of nyms in the latent space, in practice it may converge to a local optimum where some nyms stay unused or where two nyms could be coalesced into one to improve performance. We have found that a useful approach is therefore to initialise BLC with only one nym, and then, after convergence, we double the number of nyms, adding Gaussian noise to the new nym feature vectors with standard deviation equal to half of the minimum inter-nym distance. At each doubling, nyms that are unused are pruned. In this way, we essentially encourage users to progressively split into smaller groups where this leads to a performance improvement. We repeat this procedure until the factorization error falls below a threshold.
Local Recommendation
When users have access to the item profiles V , this allows increased flexibility in the way in which user ratings are predicted. For example, one approach is to use the predicted ratings (Ũ P u ) T V for the nym selected by user u. Alternatively, user u might exploit the information in their sole possession, that is, the knowledge of their own private rating, to find the pointx in the latent space that minimises v∈V(u) given V and the ratings R u,V(u) already made by user u. This least-squares optimisation can be solved locally by the user on his or her own computer and so in a private manner. When the user has only rated a small number of items, this prediction is likely to be worse than the nym-based recommendation. However, we can combine the best from both worlds by solving a joint-weighted least-squares problem [Draper et al. 1966] , in which user u locates his or her position in the latent space that also minimises the distance fromŨ ·,g , where g is the nym used by user u. More formally,
where I k is a diagonal k × k matrix and w, σ 2 L are design parameters. Then the recommendation is computed byxV . We will refer to this enhanced algorithm as BLC local . We test this technique in Section 8.
Factorization Frequency
As illustrated in Figure 3 , Algorithm 1 is partitioned into a private component run by each user u ∈ U and a public system component. Given (nym,rating) pairs supplied by the users, the system component calculates nym rating matrixR and factorizes it intoŨ, V using an estimate of (·). The user component run by user u selects the nym to be used by user u using the current value ofŨ, V . Rather than factorizingR every time a new rating is supplied or a user changes nym, the system workload can be reduced by carrying out the factorization less frequently. Figure 11 plots the prediction RMSE vs. the factorization frequency and the number of users n over 500 samples, using the same parameters as in the other simulations (but without Gaussian noise). The update frequency is specified as the fraction of users that have executed their private part of Algorithm 1 between each factorization, and a subset of users performs updates between each matrix factorization (user ordering is chosen from a permutation drawn uniformly at random for every execution of Block 2 of Algorithm 1). It can be seen that, perhaps unsurprisingly, when we re-factorize after every individual user update we obtain the best performance, and performance decreases as the factorization frequency decreases. That is, there is a tradeoff between computational effort and prediction accuracy. However, as the number of users n increases, it can be seen that the performance cost becomes less, presumably because the absolute number of user updates between factorizations is increasing, and for n > 1,000 users a factorization period of 10% seems reasonable.
Cold Start
In all of the experiments, we simulate the problem of cold start by starting with no ratings and gradually filling the set O of observed ratings one user at a time. We cycle through a random permutation of the users until O contains the full training set. Every After the first permutation of users is completed, every time a user is selected it will potentially changeR, P, and (·), moving all its ratings to a different nym.
PERFORMANCE WITH REAL DATA
Jester, Movielens, Dating and Books Datasets
We follow the workflow and use the results of Kannan et al. [2014] : The algorithms compared are alternating least-squares with regularisation (ALSWR) [Zhou et al. 2008 ], SGD [Funk 2006 ], SVD++ [Koren 2008 ], Bias-SVD [Koren 2008 ], and BMF [Kannan et al. 2014 ] on the datasets summarised in Table I . For each dataset, we used the latent space dimension d that yielded the best RMSE in Kannan et al. [2014] and used the same proportional split among training, validation, and test data (85%, 5%, and 10%, respectively) and the same validation technique (subsampling validation). We include the Book dataset for completeness of comparison, even if it is a sort of "degenerate" dataset, so sparse that using the global book average has been proven to be more effective that the state-of-the-art collaborative filtering techniques. We stress that in the following only the BMF algorithm has optimal performance because the other algorithms have many other parameters (other than d) that could be optimised but that have been kept at their default values by the authors of the comparison. We did not tune the BLC regularisation parameters, instead keeping the variances of the priors large (1,000) and relying on the averaging between the users sharing the same nym to control overfitting. Figure 12 shows the RMSE of BLC vs. the number of nyms used, and Table II summarises the RMSE values. It can be seen that BLC and BLC local are competitive with the state of the art, with only minimal tuning (namely of the number of nyms). That is, privacy-enhanced recommendation need not come at the cost of reduced prediction accuracy.
Note also that only a small number of nyms is needed: fewer than 20 nyms gives good performance for all datasets. That is, real data do indeed appear to possess a group structure of the kind we have assumed. Further, the small number of nyms means that we can expect that each nym is shared by a large number of users thereby providing a strong hiding in the crowd form of privacy-this is discussed in more detail below. 
Another Comparison for Movielens 10M
We now compare BLC with another family of algorithms, based on nuclear norm regularisation, for the Movielens 10M dataset. The algorithms are as follows:
JSH. An extension of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm for optimising a function over the bounded positive semidefinite cone [Jaggi et al. 2010 ]. Soft-Impute. A soft singular value thresholding algorithm [Mazumder et al. 2010 parameters of before and converging at eight nyms. It can be seen that, once again, the prediction accuracy of BLC is competitive with, if not superior to, the state of the art.
Netflix Dataset
Our evaluation would not be complete without showing results for the classic Netflix challenge datasets, for which all the algorithms listed above have been initially designed. Unfortunately, the Netflix validation set is no longer available. Following Kannan et al. [2014] , we therefore tested BLC against the validation set that was supplied as part of the training package (using the same 1.4M ratings training set described in Table I ). As before, we used the latent space dimension d = 20 that yielded the best RMSE for the other algorithms in Kannan et al. [2014] , and we did not tune BLC parameters. It can be seen from Table IV that BLC achieves the second-best performance, using 128 nyms.
In Figure 13 , we compare BLC with the classic matrix factorization algorithm for a dense (26%) subset of the Netflix dataset, obtained by selecting the top 1,000 items and the top 10,000 users that rated them. These results are useful to further confirm that use of a small number p = 100 of nyms is sufficient to match the classic matrix factorization approach on this dataset, and for a larger number of nyms the performance surpasses that of the classic approach.
PRIVACY PERFORMANCE
As discussed in Section 3, the attacks of interest can be decomposed into two types: (i) attacks that seek to learn which nym a user belongs to and (ii) attacks that seek to learn which items a user has rated, and what that rating is, given knowledge of the nym to which the user belongs.
With regard to (i), lacking additional side information, the attacker can try to guess the correct nym using the information in , that is, exploiting the fact that some nyms might contain more users than others: The prevalent nym is the best bet for the attacker, and the more the user-nym distribution is far from the uniform distribution, the more chance the attacker has to correctly guess the nym used by an arbitrary user. In the worst case for the attacker (uniform distribution), the user can get an indistinguishability probability of 1/ p, where p is the number of nyms, that is, we have a form of k-anonymity [Sweeney 2002 ] with k = p. In general, the probability P g of guessing the right nym is equal to the number of users in the largest nym divided by the total number of users. Table V plots P g for each of the datasets considered in the previous section, with Figure 14 showing more detail for the Movielens dataset. For the online book dataset BLC converged with one nym, leading to a probability of guessing P g of 100%. But it is interesting to note that if we let the algorithm run until it is using eight nyms, P g decreases to 15.24% with a mere increase of 1.2% in the prediction RMSE. All the other datasets have a P g of less than 23%. The use of nyms therefore provides a reasonable level of protection against this first type of attack. We now consider the second type of attack of interest, where an attacker seeks to learn which items a user has rated given knowledge of the nym to which the user belongs. We define the following privacy measure:
where n is the nym index, j the item index, ( j) nn the number of users in nym n who have rated item j, and v∈V (v) nn is the total number of users sharing nym n. It can be seen that p(n, j), which we refer to as the association probability, is an estimate of the probability that a user rated movie j, given that the user chose nym n. Hence, smaller values of p(n, j) correspond to increased privacy in the sense that it is harder for an attacker to learn that a specific user in nym n rated item j, whereas when p(n, j) = 1, then every user in nym n has rated item j, and so an attacker can be certain that a target user in nym n has rated that item. Intuitively, we expect that as the number of users increases, then p(n, j) will tend to decrease and so privacy increases. Figure 15 shows the distribution over all the nyms of the association probability of the worst item. As expected, it can be seen that there is a downward trend with the number of users for both the Movielens and online dating datasets. When the number of users is more than around 10% of that in the dataset, then the association probability is always less than 0.3, that is, each user can deny that they rated any given item with probability Fig. 15 . Boxplot of the association probability of the worst item vs. the number of users in the system for the Movielens and Online dating datasets when using BLC. at least 0.7 even when an attacker knows which nym the user belongs to. This seems like a substantial level of deniability, sufficient for most practical purposes. Figure 16 shows the impact of increasing the number of nyms used. It can be seen that using more nyms improves prediction accuracy but reduces the level of privacy, as might be expected. However, the reduction in privacy is relatively small, with the association probability remaining consistently below 0.3. Compared to the other algorithms considered in Section 8, BLC leads to an association probability decrease of at least 70% in all cases.
CONCLUSIONS
We propose a privacy-enhanced matrix factorization recommender that exploits the fact that users can often be grouped together by interest. This allows a form of "hiding in the crowd" privacy. We introduce a novel matrix factorization approach suited to making recommendations in a shared group (or nym) setting and the BLC algorithm for carrying out this matrix factorization in a privacy-enhanced manner. We demonstrate that the increased privacy does not come at the cost of reduced recommendation
